As I said in the email you quoted, SSL is actually becoming a concern, as there is more room for monitoring with open networks these days. Client to server communications should have an expectation of privacy. That being said, when the conversation is started with the idea that each server should hash the address independently, then channel operators would have no protection from server to server movements by a rogue client. Nick based hostmasks allow for a collection of hostmasks to be generated.
The potential from abuse by a vhost is mitigated by wildcarding the ip address, which can't be done with hostmasks.
Additionally, with each hostmask now being independent, wildcard bans on ISPs become ineffective, and the current limitations on ban list lengths become a major shortfall.
Providing the capability without proper planning into all the affected systems will easily create room for abuse, especially if the system isn't properly tested for abuse potential.
Specific examples of how hard it is for your average channel operator to keep a determined attacker out of a channel when the IRCD provides the attacker with the ability to change their hostmask can be seen on any network that does provide the address. I know I myself have abused the capabilities of other networks easy enough, so it's not impossible.
I personally don't see how hostmasking provides any end user security, as the vast majority of the network users are not dealing with attacks against themselves or their connections, and since the vast majority of attacks on the network are through query anyways with OMG DO THIS FOR OPS //decode
It's good to hear that SSL is coming, as more and more of our users these days are using untrusted public connections.
On Tue, Oct 13, 2009 at 9:19 PM, Jason Hill <secrtagnt@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2009 at 7:43 PM, Vin King <vin.king@gmail.com> wrote:
> DALnet has successfully done no hostmasking for over a decade, so if it
> ain't broke, don't fix it, in my opinion. Client side ssl, though, I feel is
> a reasonable enhancement request. What with more places offering wifi, and
> internet options on the go these days, I feel a more secure client to server
> communication is higher priority than hostmask offerings.
>
With that line of reasoning, there is no reason to add additional
features to the ircd, ever -- including client-side SSL.
I don't have strong feelings for or against hostmasking, but using
your "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" reasoning, coupled with the
belief that it increases the potential for abuse, as a case to not
implement this feature just seems rather silly to me. This argument
surfaces every time hostmasking is proposed on this list. Do you have
any specific examples as to how this would make banning more
difficult, or increase abuse across the network?
As previously mentioned by another poster, other networks have shown
that hostmasking can be implemented in a successful manner. Now, does
this mean DALnet should offer hostmasking simply because a vast
majority of other networks do? No, but DALnet can use them as a
reference point on what does and does not work should a decision be
made to implement this feature.
-SecretAgent
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